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Abstract
We explore the costs and beneﬁts of informality associated with the informal sector
lying outside the tax regime in a two-sector New Keynesian model. The informal
sector is more labour intensive, has a lower labour productivity, is untaxed and has a
classical labour market. The formal sector bears all the taxation costs, produces all
the government services and capital goods, and wages are determined by a real wage
norm. We identify two welfare costs of informalization: (1) long-term costs restricting
taxes to the formal sector and (2) short-term ﬂuctuation costs of tax changes to ﬁnance
ﬂuctuations in government spending. The beneﬁt of informality derives from its wage
ﬂexibility. We investigate whether taxing the informal sector and thereby reducing its
size sees a net welfare improvement.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J65, E24, E26, E32
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C Quadratic Approximation of Welfare 301 Introduction
With around 60% of workers employed informally, mainly in developing and emerging
economies, and with a possible increase in the number of informally employed due to the
recent economic crises, informality can be expected to stay for many years to come (Jutting
and de Laiglesia (2009)). The OECD document suggests: “Governments should face this
reality and incorporate informal employment into their policy making”. At present we do
not know much about the eﬃcacy of monetary and ﬁscal policies in economies with a
large informal sector. We believe that the study of informality can shed new light on the
impact of macroeconomic policies on the economic performance of developing and emerging
economies. Below we show some ﬁgures describing the importance of the informal economy
in developing and emerging economies in terms of employment and GDP shares. Informal
employment, namely jobs and activities in the production and sales of legal goods which
are not regulated or protected by the state, ranges from 25% to 75%.
Figure 1: Informal Employment as % of Non-Agricultural Employment
The phenomenon, that we refer in our paper as ‘informality’ has been discussed using
diﬀerent terminology: unregistered, hidden, shadow, underground and, in a more restric-
tive sense black, economy. Chen (2007) describes the move from the ‘old’ concept of the
informal sector to a more comprehensive view of the informal economy. The ‘new’ view
of informality which focuses on the worker and informal employment, that is employment
without any sort of protection, includes self-employment in unregistered ﬁrms and wage
employment in unprotected jobs. 1 According to the deﬁnition used, the estimates of the
1In this paper we mainly look at the informal sector which can be deﬁned as “all informal enterprises”
so employment in the informal sector refers to all employment in enterprises classiﬁed as informal according
1Figure 2: Informal Sector as % of GDP
size of the informal economy can be very diﬀerent as ﬁgures 1 and 2 imply.
The common view is that a large informal sector is thought to be detrimental for
the oﬃcial economy, but here we do not take any particular position and we attempt
to identify the impact of informality on the formal economy by weighting, both, costs
and beneﬁts of economies with a large informal sector. On the one hand, the informal
enterprises can be seen as less productive due to the limited access to credit and/or public
services. Similarly, the informal sector is often associated with inferior working conditions
and low ﬁscal revenue. On the other hand, in a world with various kind of rigidities, the
informal sector can beneﬁt the formal economy by allowing more ﬂexibility in the system2.
Dell’Anno (2008) provides an interesting overview on the positive and negative impact of
informality looking at the substitution or complementarity hypothesis between the two
sectors. In the paper, the informal sector can act as a stabilizer, but the impact on GDP
growth is ambiguous.3 The assessment in terms of costs and beneﬁts of informality is done
by modelling what we believe are some of the most relevant positive and negative aspects
of the informal economy.
to a common set of criteria (i.e. size and registration status). It follows that we do not distinguish informal
workers in the informal and in the formal sectors. See Bosch (2006) and Bosch (2007) for a modeling of
formal and informal contracts within the formal sector.
2See Batini et al. (2010).
3In the next section we provide more insights on this point.
2Table 1: Formal-Informal Sector Diﬀerences
Labour Market Productivity Taxation Labour Share
F Sector frictions high taxed low
I Sector no frictions low untaxed high
Here we focus on the labour market aspects of informality, and study the costs and
beneﬁts of informality in an economy where the size of the informal sector depends on
an employment tax. This model describes an economy with two sectors producing two
diﬀerent goods. In equilibrium, workers who do not ﬁnd a job in the unionized formal
labour market (i.e. the sector with a higher labour standard), move to the informal
sector. In our model public goods are produced formally and the two sectors have diﬀerent
technologies, the informal sector being more labour intensive. A further distinction is that
we introduce market friction in the labour market in the formal sector, whilst the informal
sector is frictionless in this respect.
A further distinction is that taxes required to ﬁnance government spending are conﬁned
to the formal sector. Thus we capture some of the main characteristics of the informal sec-
tor: labour-intensiveness, low productivity and wage ﬂexibility. These diﬀerences between
the two sectors are summarized in Table 1.
Price stickiness is added to both sectors to give us a New Keynesian aspect and a
model that can be used to investigate monetary policy. We study a balance budget ﬁscal
policy where distortionary taxes adjust to exogenous government spending and optimal
monetary policy. Our modelling approach then captures the a priori ambiguous impact
of informality. On the one hand, the ﬂexible and frictionless informal labour market
reduces business cycle costs. On the other hand, informality brings about a cost owing
to the realistic assumption that it lies outside the tax regime. Our experiment consists
of allowing the taxes to be gathered from the informal sector (in which cases it looses a
key characteristic of informality) resulting in a reduction in the size of this sector. There
are then beneﬁts from tax smoothing across the two sectors, but costs from a reduction
in wage ﬂexibility. Our objective is to quantify the net gain gain or loss from this change
in the tax regime. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that try to quantify the costs
and beneﬁts of informality in a dynamic general equilibrium model with New Keynesian
features.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows how our general
equilibrium economy relates to similar theoretical frameworks within the DSGE and the
informal economy literatures. Section 3 sets out details of our model. Section 4 describes
3the calibration based on the steady state. Section 5 studies optimal monetary policy
alongside the two tax regimes with a balanced budget constraint. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background Literature
Conesa et al. (2002) and Ihrig and Moe (2004) represents an attempt in introducing
an informal sector within a dynamic general equilibrium RBC framework. Ihrig and
Moe (2004) in a dynamic general equilibrium model describe the informal sector trade-oﬀ
between taxes and productivity.4 These papers introduce a second sector into a standard
Real Business Cycle (RBC) model which is described as an “underground” economy that
has a diﬀerent technology, produces goods and services that could otherwise be produced
in the formal sector, but is not registered in NI accounts.
Our model is related to a series of works that incorporate labour market frictions into
New Keynesin (NK) DSGE models to explain the cyclical behaviour of employment, job
creation, job destruction and inﬂation rate in response to a monetary policy shock. Castillo
and Montoro (2008) formally introduce an informal sector in a DSGE model developed
from Blanchard and Gali (2007) and model a labour market economy with formal and
informal labour contracts within a New Keynesian model with labour market frictions.
Informality is a result of hiring costs, which are a function of the labour market tightness.
In equilibrium , ﬁrms in the wholesale sectors balance the higher productivity of a formal
production process with the lower hiring costs of the informal process. Marginal costs
will then become a function also of the proportion of informal jobs in the economy. The
interesting results of this theoretical framework is that during period of high aggregate
demand the informal sector expands due to lower hiring costs associated with this technol-
ogy. This creates a link between informality and the dynamics of inﬂation. In particular,
the authors show that “informal workers act as a buﬀer stock of labour that allows ﬁrms to
expand output without putting pressure on wages”. Castillo and Montoro (2008) allow for
a voluntary decision where the marginal worker is indiﬀerent between formal and informal
sector. Labour market regulations may reduce labour demand without introducing seg-
mentation per se. While we recognize this picture is realistic in many advanced economies
and there is also evidence that shows the existence of a voluntary, small ﬁrms sector in
some developing countries (see Perry et al. (2007)), we believe that in the majority of
the developing world informality is a result of segmentation where workers turn to the
informal labour market when they cannot ﬁnd a job in the formal sector. For this reason
4The informal sector ﬁrms produce the same good of the formal sector paying lower taxes, but due to
limited access to capital they are less productive than their formal counterpart. Due to the assumption of
homogeneous good, the size of the informal sector is mainly driven by capital accumulation.
4we depart from Castillo and Montoro (2008) and, as in Satchi and Temple (2009) and
Marjit and Kar (2008) we model the idea that: “Unemployment is a luxury” and that
“informal sector activities provide an unoﬃcial safety-net in the absence of state-provided
unemployment insurance”.
As in Zenou (2008), we allow for a frictionless informal labour market.5 We do not
model this idea explicitly, but our competitive informal labour market implies free-entry
and an instantaneous hiring process. While Zenou’s framework has no NK features and
focuses on the evaluation of various labour market policies on the unemployment rate of an
economy with an informal sector, we also introduce labour market frictions in the formal
sector, but we do not explicitly model the matching process. Rather we follow another
modelling option favoured in the literature by introducing a wage norm in the formal
sector. While we explore the general equilibrium features of informality, our model is in
line with the Harris and Todaro tradition (Harris and Todaro, 1970) in describing a very
simple labour market structure where labour in the formal sector is ﬁxed at a higher than
the market clearing level. See also Marjit and Kar (2008) and Agenor and Montiel (1996)
for a similar assumption. As discussed in Satchi and Temple (2009), a richer labour market
structure implies a wage in the formal sector which is endogenously determined. While this
can be a promising future development we believe the simplifying assumption allows us to
obtain interesting conclusions without adding further complications to the already complex
modelling framework. In this respect, we should also mention that, following the critics
on the inability of the search matching model to generate the observed unemployment
volatility as reported in Shimer (2005), a series of papers depart from the ﬂexible wage
assumption in order to generate enough volatility in the unemployment rate (see Blanchard
and Gali (2007), Krause and Lubik (2007) and Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005)). The
introduction of a real wage norm in New Keynesian models has been described as one of
the possible way to reconcile the model with the data.6
Our paper contribution to this literature is as follows. First we compare the costs and
beneﬁts of increasing the size of the formal sector, by allowing a more equal distribution
of taxes between the two regimes.7 Second, we look at the eﬃcacy of monetary policy
and for this reason we require a more general framework with price rigidity. We introduce
5As clariﬁed in Zenou’s paper \.. in the informal sector, either people are self-employed or work with
relatives or friends and thus do not apply formally for jobs posted in newspapers or employment agency".
6However the introduction of such real wage rigidity is not immune of critics. Thomas (2008) introduces
staggered nominal wages and points to a series of advantages of his approach with respect to the real wage
norm assumption while Hornstein et al. (2005) and Pissarides (2008) claim that wage rigidity needs to be
accompanied by an unrealistic assumption on the labour share and points instead at the introduction of
demand shocks as a possible solution to the unemployment volatility puzzle.
7Clearly, the exercise of increasing taxes in the informal sector is not costless given the diﬃculties of
observing and taxing the informal sector. We comment on this point in the conclusions.
5New Keynesian price rigidities in the usual way, as in Castillo and Montoro (2008), but
then proceed to analyse the interaction of informal and formal sectors and the implications
for monetary policy. Our analysis of both the steady-state (long-run) and business cycle
(short-run) costs and beneﬁts of an informal economy are particularly novel features.
3 The Model
Consider a two-sector “Formal” (F) and “Informal” (I) economy, producing diﬀerent goods
with diﬀerent technologies which sell at diﬀerent retail prices, PF,t and PI,t, say. Labour
and capital are the variable factor inputs and the informal sector is less capital intensive.
Government spending is ﬁnanced by an employment tax as in Zenou (2008). In the general
set-up this can be shared by the formal and informal sectors giving us a framework in which
the role of tax incidence can be studied as one of the drivers of informalization. The other
driver in our model is the degree of real wage rigidity in the formal sector
To help the exposition, we ﬁrst abstract from investment costs and government debt.
3.1 Households
A proportion nF,t of household members work in the formal sector. Hours hF,t and hours
hI,t are supplied in the F and I sectors respectively. Members who work in sector i = I,F
derive utility U(Ct,Li,t) where Ct is household shared consumption and leisure Li,t =
1   hi,t and we assume that8
UC > 0, UL > 0, UCC  0, ULL  0 (1)
. The representative household single-period utility is
Λt = Λ(Ct,nF,t,hF,t,hI,t) = nF,tU(Ct,1   hF,t) + (1   nF,t)U(Ct,1   hI,t) (2)
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where Rn,t is the nominal interest rate over the interval [t,t + 1] for riskless bonds set by
the central bank at the beginning of the period. Note that substituting (6) and (7) into
(3) gives (4) so that (4) or (3) are superﬂuous for the set-up. Total labour supply is found
by equating the marginal rate of substitution between labour and leisure with the real













We assume that the real wage in the formal sector is a combination of an exogenous









Pt , it follows from ULL < 0 that the household will choose less leisure and
more work eﬀort in the formal sector; i.e., hF,t > hI,F.
3.2 Wholesale Firms
Wholesale output in the two sectors is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function
Y W
i,t = F(Ai,t,Ni,t,Ki,t), i = I,F (11)
where Ai,t are a technology, total labour supply Ni,t = ni,thi,t, i = I,F. Capital inputs
are Ki,t, i = I,F and we assume capital is accumulated from formal output only.
7The ﬁrst-order conditions are
PW
F,tFNF,t = WF,t + PtτF,t (12)
PW
I,tFNI,t = WI,t + PtτI,t (13)
PW
I,tFKI,t = PW
F,tFKF,t = Pt[Rt + δ] (14)
where PW
F,t and PW
I,t are wholesale prices, τF,t, τF,t are the employment real tax rates in
the formal sector and informal sectors respectively and Rt + δ is the real cost of capital
(in consumption units), the ex post real interest rate over the interval [t   1,t] plus the
depreciation rate. Rt is deﬁned by







where Rn,t is the nominal interest charged on loans made in period t.
3.3 Retail Firms
We now introduce a retail sector of monopolistic ﬁrms within each sector buying wholesale
goods and diﬀerentiating the product at a proportional resource cost ciY W
i,t in sectors
i = F,I. In a free-entry equilibrium proﬁts are driven to zero. Retail output for ﬁrm f in
sector is then Yi,t(f) = (1 ci)Y W
i,t (f) where Y W
i,t is produced according to the production
technology (11) at prices PW
i,t . Let the number of diﬀerentiated varieties produced in the
informal and formal sectors be νF and νI respectively. Each is produced by a single retail
ﬁrm and the numbers of these ﬁrms is ﬁxed.9 Let CF,t(f) and CI,t(f) denote the home
consumption of the representative household of variety f produced in sectors F and I.



































9This model structure closely follows a model of two interacting economies in the New Open Economy
Literature.
8where ζF,ζI > 1 are the elasticities of substitution between varieties in the two sectors.
















































and inter-sector decisions are as before.
We introduce endogenous investment, It, and exogenous government spending Gt both
assumed to consist entirely of formal output. Then maximizing the investment and gov-













Using (20)–(23) it follows that total demands for each diﬀerentiated product are given
by























Retail ﬁrms follow Calvo pricing. In sector i = F,I, assume that there is a probability
of 1   ξi at each period that the price of each good f is set optimally to ˆ Pi,t(f). If the
price is not re-optimized, then it is held constant.10 For each producer f the objective is
10Thus we can interpret
1
1 i as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged in sector
i = F;I.







ˆ Pi,t(f)   Pi,t+kMCi,t+k
]
where Dt,t+k is the stochastic discount factor over the interval [t,t + k], subject to a

















and by the law of large numbers the evolution of the price index is given by
P
1−ζi
i,t+1 = ξi (Pi,t)
1−ζi + (1   ξi)( ˆ Pi,t+1(f))1−ζi (27)
These summations can be expressed as diﬀerence equations as follows. First deﬁne for
i = I,F, Πi,t 
Pi;t
Pi;t 1 = πi,t + 1. Then from the Euler equation we have that Dt,t+k =
βk UC;t+k
UC;t . Using this result we can derive the aggregate price dynamics for i = I,F as
Hi,t   ξiβEt[Π
ζi−1












Hi,t = Ji,t (30)
1 = ξiΠ
ζi−1







Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology in the wholesale sectors (see all functional forms be-
low) for each diﬀerentiated product in the F and I sectors we equate supply and demand
in the retail sectors to give












10using (24) and (25). Then solving for Ni,t, i = F,I and deﬁning aggregate employment-
hours in each sector by Ni,t =
∑νi





















is a measure of the price dispersion across ﬁrms in sector i = F,I. Then the aggregate
equilibrium conditions in each retail sector are
YF,t = CF,t + It + Gt (36)
It = Kt+1   (1   δ)Kt (37)
Kt = KF,t + KI,t (38)
YI,t = CI,t (39)
with aggregate production functions (34).
Given government spending Gt, technology Ai,t, the nominal interest rate Rn,t, the real
wage norm RWt and choice of numeraire, the above system deﬁnes a general equilibrium
in Ct, Pt, Pi,t, PW
i,t , Ci,t, hF,t, hI,t, WF,t, WI,t, ni,t, Yi,t = (1 ci)Y W
i,t and ˆ Pi,t for i = I,F.
The structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 3.
3.5 Monetary Policy and Government Budget Constraint
Monetary policy is conducted in terms of the nominal interest rate Rn,t set at the beginning
of period t. The expected real interest rate over the interval [t,t + 1] is given by







In what follows we consider interest rate policy in the form of the optimal commitment
policy.
Fiscal policy assumes a balanced budget constraint in which an employment tax on
only formal ﬁrms, τt, ﬁnances government spending. This takes the form
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Figure 3: Model Structure
noting that government services are provided out of formal output. We assume a tax rule
τI,t = kτF,t ; k 2 [0,1] (42)
allowing for the possibility that some tax can be collected in the informal economy.
3.6 Investment Costs
Now we generalize the model to allow for investment costs and government debt. It is
convenient to introduce capital producing ﬁrms that at time t convert It of output into
(1   S(Xt))It of new capital, where Xt  It
It 1, sold at a real price Qt. We then replace
12(37) and (14) with
Kt+1 = (1   δ)Kt + (1   S(Xt))It ; S′, S′′  0; S(1) = S′(1) = 0



















Then as S(Xt) ! 0, Qt ! 1 and (43) gets back to (14).
3.7 Functional Forms
We choose a Cobb-Douglas production function, AR(1) processes for government spend-





logAi,t   log ¯ Ai,t = ρAi(Ai,t−1   ¯ Ai,t−1) + ϵAi,t (46)








; σ > 1









= 1 + g (49)
where ϵAi,t,ϵGi,t, ID with zero mean. The choice of utility function in (48) is chosen to
be consistent with a steady state balanced growth path (henceforth BGP) where LAP ¯ At
and ¯ Gt are time-varying. As pointed out in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), chapter 9,
this requires a careful choice of the form of the utility as a function of consumption and
labour eﬀort. It is achieved by a utility function which is non-separable in consumption
and leisure unless σ = 1. A utility function of the form (48) achieves this. The marginal
utilities are then then given by

















134 Model Calibration and Steady State Analysis
The zero inﬂation balanced growth steady state of the model economy is given by
¯ ΛC,t+1
¯ ΛC,t




= (1 + g)((1−ϱ)(1−σ)−1) (53)
using (50). Thus from (5)




The rest of the steady state is given by
nI,t + nF,t = 1 (55)
P =
[
w(PF)1−µ + (1   w)(PI)1−µ] 1
1  (56)
¯ Yi,t = (1   ci)(nihi ¯ Ai,t)αi ¯ K
1−αi
I,t ; i = F,I (57)
ϱ ¯ Ct
(1   ϱ)(1   hi)
= ¯ Wi,t ; i = F,I (58)
αiPW
i ¯ Y W
i,t
Pnihi



















¯ It = (δ + g)( ¯ KI,t + ¯ KF,t) (63)











¯ Ct + ¯ It + ¯ Gt (65)
PF
P
¯ Gt = (nFhF ¯ τF,t + nIhI¯ τI,t) (66)
¯ τi,t = τi ¯ Wi,t ; i = F,I (67)







14where consumption, labour augmenting technical change, the real wage and tax rates, and
government spending (all indicated by ¯ Xt) are growing at a common growth rate. We
impose a free entry condition on retail ﬁrms in this steady state which drives monopolistic




Pi¯ Yi,t = PW
i ¯ Y W
i,t ; i = F,I
Given exogenous trends for ¯ Ai,t and ¯ Gt, the tax rates and RWt, these equations
give 21 relationships in 22 variables R, P, PF, PI, PW
F , PW
I , ¯ Ct, ¯ CF,t, ¯ CI,t, ¯ YF,t, ¯ YI,t,
¯ WI,t, ¯ WF,t, nI, nF, hI, hF, ¯ I, ¯ KF ¯ KI , ¯ τF,t, ¯ τI,t. One of the prices (it is convenient to






ξF = ξI 0.75
ζF = ζI 7.0
µ 1.5
ρaF = ρaI = ρg 0.7
ρuI = ρuF 0

















Turning to calibration, the idea is to assume an observed baseline steady state equi-
librium in the presence of some observed policy. We then use this observed equilibrium
to solve for model parameters consistent with this observation The calibrated parameters
are:
 AF;t
 AI;t , ϱ, w, β given observations or measurements of nF, hF,
 WF
 WI  1 + rw, R and
 Gt
 YF;t  gyF. We also use estimates of δ, σ αI and αF from micro-econometric studies.
Appendix A sets out the details of the calibration of the parameters of the model and this
is summarized in Table 2.
In Table 3 the full steady-state benchmark equilibrium with no taxation in the informal
sector used for the calibration is compared with a new steady state in which both sectors
have the same tax rate. In this way, proceeding from k = 1 back to k = 0 we can show how
16the incentive to avoid taxation drives formalization. Thus we see in the tax-smoothing
case a larger formal sector (nF = 0.58 as opposed to nF = 0.5 in the baseline case) and
a lower relative price in the formal sector (because output is higher). The real wage falls
slightly in both sectors and consequently less labour is supplied per household member.
The rise (fall) in the relative price of informal goods sector brings about a higher (lower)
capital-output ratio in the informal (formal) sector, but the overall investment ratio is
almost unchanged.






















Table 3. Steady State Equilibrium Values: k = 0,111
All this is with the wage mark-up in the formal sector rw = 0.5, our measure of wage
stickiness. Figure 4 shows this process of informalization for diﬀerent degrees of wage
rigidity and illustrates how an increase in this friction also drives down participation in
the formal sector. For example, with k = 0 and no friction the size of the formal sector is
close to nF = 0.82. When rw = 0.75, this halves, falling to under nF = 0.4.
Figure 5 shows the welfare eﬀects on a representative household as the tax burden is
smoothed over the two sectors. As k approaches unity the utility becomes very ﬂat and
11ce = ∆Λ=0:0065 = 4:38%.















Figure 4: The Size of Formal Sector and Tax Burden: k = Ratio of Informal-
Formal Tax Rates. rw =wage mark-up in the formal sector.
















Figure 5: Welfare and Tax Burden: k = Ratio of Informal-Formal Tax Rates.
rw =wage mark-up in the formal sector.
18close to the optimum. We can work out the equivalent permanent increase in consumption
implied by this optimum by ﬁrst computing the increase from a 1% consumption change
at any point on the balanced growth trend as nFU(1.01  ¯ Ct,LF) + (1   nF)U( ¯ Ct,LI)
at some time t = 0 say. In our best steady state equilibrium for rw = 0.5 at k = 1,
this works out as 0.0059, so any increase in welfare DΛ implies a consumption equivalent
ce = D
0.0059% as calculated in Table 3.
5 Optimal Stabilization Policy
We adopt a linear-quadratic framework for the optimization problem facing the monetary
authority. This is particularly convenient as we can then summarize outcomes in terms of
unconditional (asymptotic) variances of macroeconomic variables and the local stability
and determinacy of particular rules. The framework also proves useful for addressing the
issue of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
In our model there are three distortions that result in the steady state output being
below the social optimum: namely, from monopolistic competition, from distortionary
taxes and from the non-market clearing wage norm. We assume that these distortions are
small in the steady state and following Woodford (2003), we can adopt a ‘small distortions’
quadratic approximation to the household’s single period utility which is accurate in the
vicinity of our zero-inﬂation steady state. Details of this quadratic approximation are









t + whIˆ h2






where coeﬃcients wc, whI, whF, wπF and wπI are deﬁned in that Appendix.
To work out the welfare in terms of a consumption equivalent percentage increase,
expanding U(C,L) as a Taylor series, a 1% permanent increase in consumption of 1 per cent
yields a ﬁrst-order welfare increase UCC  0.01. Since standard deviations are expressed
in terms of percentages, the welfare loss terms which are proportional to the covariance
matrix (and pre-multiplied by 1/2) are of order 10−4. The losses reported in the paper
are scaled by a factor 1   β. Letting ∆Ω be these losses relative to the optimal policy,
then ce = ∆Ω  0.01%.
We can modify welfare criterion so as to approximately impose an interest rate zero
lower bound (ZLB) so that this event hardly ever occurs. Our quadratic approximation to




t]′ and Q is a
19symmetric matrix. As in Woodford (2003), chapter 6, the ZLB constraint is implemented
by modifying the single period welfare loss to Lt + wrr2
n,t. Then following Levine et al.
(2008), the policymaker’s optimization problem is to choose wr and the unconditional
distribution for rn,t (characterized by the steady state variance) shifted to the right about
a new non-zero steady state inﬂation rate and a higher nominal interest rate, such that the
probability, p, of the interest rate hitting the lower bound is very low. This is implemented
by calibrating the weight wr for each of our policy rules so that z0(p)σr < Rn where
z0(p) is the critical value of a standard normally distributed variable Z such that prob
(Z  z0) = p, Rn = 1
β(1+guc)   1 + π∗  Rn(π∗) is the steady state nominal interest rate,
σ2
r = var(rn) is the unconditional variance and π∗ is the new steady state inﬂation rate.
Given σr the steady state positive inﬂation rate that will ensure rn,t  0 with probability
1   p is given by12
π∗ = max[z0(p)σr   Rn(0)  100,0] (71)
nF Tax Distortion Ω0 σ2
r Pr(ZLB) π∗ ce
0.50 No 104 0.38 0.000 0 0
0.59 No 110 0.11 0.000 0 0.06
0.50 Yes 133 0.07 0.000 0 0.29
0.59 Yes 127 0.11 0.000 0 0.23
Table 4. Optimal Rules with Commitment
Table 4 sets out results for optimal stabilization monetary rule in the face of exogenous
stochastic shocks as calibrated in Table 2. We compute outcomes with and without tax
distortions so that we can distinguish the consequences of a loss of wage ﬂexibility from the
gains of tax smoothing in stabilization policy as we move from a smaller to a larger formal
sector. The last column in table 4 gives the consumption equivalent welfare loss from
ﬂuctuations relative to the lowest loss which occurs in the ﬁrst row where tax distortions
are eliminated and the size of the informal sector is highest.
Examining the ﬁrst four rows without tax distortions we see that proceeding from a
high (nI = 0.5) to a low size of the informal sector (nI = 1   0.59 = 0.41) results in an
increase in welfare costs of ce = 0.06%. In fact owing to the high calibrated steady state
nominal interest rate and the low volatilities reported in the Table ZLB considerations are
irrelevant in this exercise. 13 The ﬁnal four rows of the table incorporate tax distortions in
12If the ineﬃciency of the steady-state output is negligible, then 
  0 is a credible new steady state
inﬂation rate. Note that in our LQ framework, the zero interest rate bound is very occasionally hit in
which case the interest rate is allowed to become negative.
13But this is not generally the case. Levine et al. (2008) show how a choice of wr and 
 can be chosen
20stabilization policy and now we observe that proceeding from a larger to a smaller informal
sector results in a net decrease in welfare costs of ce = 0.29   0.23 = 06%. It follows that
the tax distortion eﬀect sees a beneﬁt of 0.12% from reducing the size of the informal sec-
tor. This is oﬀset by losses of 0.06% from the wage ﬂexibility eﬀect. Table 5 summarizes
this cost-beneﬁt analysis bringing the earlier steady state and stabilization results together.
Source of Cost ce (%)
No Tax Smoothing at Steady State 3.10
Stabilization Cost: Wage Flexibility -0.06
Stabilization Cost: No Tax Smoothing 0.12
Net Stabilization Cost 0.06
Table 5. Summary of The Costs of Informality.
These stabilization eﬀects it should be noted are very small compared with the tax
distortion eﬀect on the steady state which sees a beneﬁt ce = 3.10% from reducing the size
of the informal sector. We have performed some sensitivity analysis allowing the calibrated
values to change within the limits discussed in our evidence set out for emerging economies
in Appendix A and this qualitative conclusion remains intact. Of course the assumption
that tax revenues can be equalized in the two sectors (k = 1) is an extreme one so this
ﬁgure is an upper bound. Moreover it is important to stress that stabilization depend
on the calibrated volatilities of the shocks. We assumed a standard deviation of 1% for
all shocks, which is a plausible ﬁgure for developing economies and in line with DSGE
Bayesian estimation, but on the small size for emerging economies. So let the standard
deviation be scaled by factor κ  1. Then the net stabilization cost in Table 5 rises to
0.06κ2. Even with κ = 5, an implausibly high value, the net stabilization eﬀect is still
dominated by the steady state eﬀect. We must conclude that in our model and with our
calibration, the steady state gains from reducing the size of the informal sector by tax
equalization far outweigh the beneﬁts from stabilization.
6 Conclusions
We have examined the possible welfare beneﬁts of reducing the size of the informal sector
by eliminating the tax incentive to be informal. The main conclusions of our paper are
that there are considerable welfare beneﬁts from tax smoothing and net beneﬁts from
optimally to satisfy the ZLB and that the gains from commitment taking into account of this constraint
rise considerably.
21stabilization with tax smoothing beneﬁts outweighing the costs in terms of less wage
ﬂexibility. We also ﬁnd that the reduction in long-term costs are much more relevant in
size than the short-term costs and beneﬁts. This is in part due to the assumption of a
standard deviation of 1% for all shocks. By increasing the volatility in line with evidence
of emerging economies, we still see the long-term impact dominating the business cycle
costs and beneﬁts.
A couple of caveats should be mentioned. First, it would be desirable to estimate
the model by Bayesian methods as is now commonplace in the literature. For advanced
economies the informal sector would become the hidden economy leading to the need to
properly take into account the lack of observability of this sector in solving for the rational
expectations equilibrium and the estimation. This is not done in this paper, nor indeed in
the DSGE literature as a whole14 and would be an important future direction for research.
Second, we have alluded to the fact that no assessment has been made of the costs of tax
collection in the informal sector. However our ﬁndings indicate that the case for tolerating
a large informal sector may rest entirely on these being very substantial, rather than the
beneﬁts from an increase in wage ﬂexibility.
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24A Calibration
The idea of calibration is to assume an observed baseline steady state equilibrium in the
presence of some observed policy. We then use this observed equilibrium to solve for
model parameters consistent with this observation For this baseline and for the purpose of
calibration only, it is convenient to choose units of wholesale output such that their prices
are unitary; i.e., PW
F = PW





















We assume ζF = ζI = ζ in which case P = PF = PI = 1
1− 1

. Similarly, we can choose
units of labour supply hI,hF so that AI = 1.
We now calibrate the parameters
 AF;t
 AI;t , ϱ, w, β given observations or measurements of
nF, hF,
 WF
 WI  1 + rw, R and
 Gt
 YF;t  gyF. We also use estimates of δ, σ αI and αF from
micro-econometric studies. For the latter Cobb-Douglas production function parameter
values we draw upon a range of values estimated in the literature using the lower and upper
bounds for the formal and informal sectors respectively. As is standard in the literature
we assume on average one-year price contracts in both sectors so that in our quarterly
model ξI = ξF = 0.25, and a 15% mark-up of monopolistic prices giving ζI = ζF  7.
Denote observations by nobs
F etc. With these observations and the steady state of the
model we can deduce the unobserved variables in the steady state and the parameter
values as follows:







= 1 + rwobs (A.2)
which determines hI.
From the government budget constraint (66) in our baseline where only the formal
sector is taxed (k = 0) we have




which determines τF and τI = kτF when both sectors are taxed. Then from (59)
αF = wsF(1 + τF) (A.4)
αI = wsI (A.5)












from which rel 
PW







Now write the production functions (57) as
¯ Y W
i,t = Ai,tnihi (KYi)
1 i
i i = I,F (A.7)
where KYi is the capital-labour ratio in sector i. From (61) and (62) and using PW
F =
PW




; i = I,F (A.8)
























 AI;t is obtained.




¯ YF,t(1   iyF   gyF)
¯ YI,t






(δ + g)( ¯ KI,t + ¯ KF,t)










cyF = 1   iyF   gobs
yF (A.12)
From (A.10), (A.11) and (A.12) we now can determine w.
Finally from (58) and (64) we have
ϱ
(1   ϱ)(1   hI)








from which ϱ is obtained. Data on emerging economies can be obtained from IMF, World
Bank and ILO statistics. As discussed in Neumeyer and Perri (2004) real interest rates in
emerging economies are very volatile and diﬃcult to calculate. Though nominal interest
26rate statistics are usually reported by local Central Banks, due to the high variability of
inﬂation in emerging economies, the calculation of the real interest rate in EMEs countries
is often cumbersome.
Uribe and Yue (2006) report quarterly data on equilibrium real interest rate for various
emerging economies over the period 1994:1-2001:4 for seven developing countries. 15 We
follow them and choose a quarterly real interest rate for emerging economies of 3.00%.
For GDP growth rates we assume an annual percentage change of 4%. Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2003) report an average GDP growth rate for a wide selection of emerging
economies (annual % change) around 4% over the period 1990-2009.
We refer to LABSTAT (ILO) (ILO (2002) for the calculation of hours of work in emerg-
ing economies and choose h=45/100. Data on government shares can be obtained from
diﬀerent sources such as IMF and World Bank. We choose World Bank and calculate an
average for selected EMEs countries to obtain a value equal to 15%. 16 For values of wage
mark-up in the formal sector, we refer to Perry et al. (2007) where Latin American data
are reported. Table 3.1 shows that, on average, informal salaried workers earn between
40 to 66 percent less than formal salaried workers. Looking at this ﬁgures, we choose a
mark-up of 50%. Finally, data on the formal sector employment as reported in various
ILO’s documents range from 60 percent to 35% in selected EMEs countries with a par-
ticular low level of 15% in India. We choose a value of 50% which is also consistent with
Spatz (2003) for Bolivia (see table 4 of their working paper).
This completes the calibration of the parameters describing the endogenous component
of the model. There are currently two exogenous shocks in the model to labour produc-
tivity in both sectors and government spending. In the linearized model of Appendix B
these are denoted respectively by ai,t and gi,t, i = I,F. We also add mark-up shocks
to the linearized Phillips Curves ui,t, i = I,F. Again following the literature we assume
AR(1) processes with calibrated persistence parameters 0.7 for the technology and demand
shocks. Mark-up shocks are assumed to be transient. The standard deviations of the in-
novation processes are taken to be unity, but later we examine more volatile economies
with a standard deviation k > 1. This completes the calibration; observations, imposed
and calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 2 of the main text.
B Linearization
Deﬁne lower case variables xt = log Xt
 Xt if Xt has a long-run trend or xt = log Xt
X otherwise
where X is the steady state value of a non-trended variable. For variables nF,t, nI,t and
15Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru’, Philippines and South Africa.
16In general, government spending in emerging economies is lower than the one in developed economies.
27ht deﬁne ˆ xt = log xt










, i = I,F are log-linear gross
interest and inﬂation rates.
Our linearized model about the BGP zero-inﬂation steady state then takes the state-
space form
aF,t+1 = ρaFaF,t + εaF,t+1 (B.1)
aI,t+1 = ρaIaI,t + εaI,t+1 (B.2)
gt+1 = ρggt + εg,t+1 (B.3)
uF,t+1 = ρuFuF,t + εuF,t+1 (B.4)
uI,t+1 = ρuIuI,t + εuI,t+1 (B.5)








Et[λC,t+1] = λC,t   Et[rt+1] (B.8)
βEt[πF,t+1] = πF,t   λF(mcF,t + uF,t) (B.9)
βEt[πI,t+1] = πI,t   λI(mcI,t + uI,t) (B.10)
with outputs deﬁned by
Et[rt+1] = rn,t   Et[πt+1] (B.11)
Et[πt+1] = wEt[πF,t+1] + (1   w)Et[πI,t+1] (B.12)
πt = wπF,t + (1   w)πI,t (B.13)






I )ˆ nF,t + ϱ(σ   1)(nFL
ϱ(1−σ)

















wI,t   pt = uLI,t   λC,t (B.17)
28ˆ hF,t : wF,t   pt = uLF,t   λC,t (B.18)
wF,t   pt = ω(wI,t   pt) (B.19)
cF,t = ct + µ(1   w)τt (B.20)
cI,t = ct   µwτt (B.21)
ˆ nF,t : yF,t = aF,t + αF(ˆ nF,t + ˆ hF,t)   (1   αF)kF,t (B.22)
ˆ hI,t : yI,t = aI,t + αI(ˆ nI,t + ˆ hI,t)   (1   αI)kI,t (B.23)







(wF,t   pt) +
τF
1 + τF
ˆ τF,t + (1   w)τt   aF,t




(wI,t   pt) +
τI
1 + τI
ˆ τI,t   wτt   aI,t
+ (1   αI)(ˆ nI,t + ˆ hI,t   kI,t) (B.26)
yI,t = cI,t (B.27)
it : yF,t = cyFcF,t + iyFit + gyF gt (B.28)
gt = (1   w)τt +
nFτF
nFτt + nIτI
(ˆ nF,t + ˆ hF,t + ˆ τF,t) +
nIτI
nFτt + nIτI
(ˆ nI,t + ˆ hI,t + ˆ τI,t)
ˆ τI,t = ˆ τF,t (B.29)











kF,t : mcF,t = mcI,t + τt + yI,t   yF,t + kF,t   kI,t (B.32)
where λi 
(1−βξi)(1−ξi)
ξi , and τi   τi
Wt/P i = I,F. Note that (B.14) deﬁnes ct, (B.22)
deﬁnes ˆ nF,t and (B.23) deﬁnes ˆ ht. Let τI = (1 k)τF where k 2 [0,1] to allow taxation to
be enforced in the informal sector. Also (B.20) and (B.21) implies ct = wcF,t +(1 w)cI,t
The ﬂexi-price ‘natural rate’ economy is found by putting mcF,t = mcI,t = 0 and
making taxes non-distortionary.
29C Quadratic Approximation of Welfare
To formulate this quadratic approximation ﬁrst consider the simpler case without capital
and with leisure constrained to be the same in both informal and formal sectors. Then
we simply approximate the utility function Ut = U(Ct,Lt) in consumption, Ct and leisure
Lt = 1   ht we start with the Taylor Series expansion about the BGP steady state17








t + higher order terms (C.1)
Next we write ct = wcF,t + (1   w)cI,t, lt =   h
1−h
ˆ ht and use the linearized resource
constraints
yF,t = aF,t + αF(ˆ nF,t + ˆ ht)   dF,t = (1   gFy)cF,t + gFygt (C.2)







;i = I,F (C.4)
and ∆i,t is the price dispersion eﬀect given by (35). By standard results (see, for example,
Gali (2008), p88) di,t is a second order term given by
di,t =
ζi(αi + (1   αi)ζi)
2αi










i,t ;i = I,F (C.6)
Then using the linearized resource constraints and the properties of eﬃciency in the
steady state: UL
UC = FNF = FNI the ﬁrst order terms in ct and lt disappear in (C.1) and


















Finally using the results (C.4)–(C.7) we can write the quadratic form of the intertem-















17The BGP is time-varying but here we drop the bar and time-script in ¯ Ut; ¯ Ct etc.









(1 + ϱ(σ   1))h2
(1   ϱ)(1   h)2
wπF = w
ζF(αF + (1   αF)ζF)
cFyαFλF
wπI =




(1   βξi)(1   ξi)
; i = F,I
For the actual model with capital and diﬀerent choices of work eﬀort in the two sectors









t + whIˆ h2











(1 + ϱ(σ   1))h2
(1   ϱ)(1   h)2 ; h = hI,hF
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